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Abstract
We examine the determinants of performance of 68 Indian state-owned enterprises in the
manufacturing sector for a five-year period: 1987 to 1991. Relative performance is de-
termined using data envelopment analysis, with variations in performance patterns subse-
quently explained using regression analysis. We note that the performance of firms in the
Indian state-owned sector is characterized by both, low performance, as well as significant
and systematic variations in the performance parameters. Size is positively associated and
age negatively associated with efficiency. Further, economic liberalization and reforms
aimed at improving the performance of state-owned firms induces efficiency gains over
time. This heterogeneity within the state-owned sector has policy implications, which we
discuss. In countries which have privatized large numbers of their state-owned firms, it is
often the larger establishments which have been sold to the public. The state-owned firms
in the manufacturing sector that can be candidates for privatization are the smaller and older
manufacturing firms. These firms may also be easier to dispose of to private investors. This
finding reinforces our central thesis that firm-level analysis within the state-owned sector
is useful and important for generating pragmatic policy guidelines.
Keywords: State-owned enterprises, economic reform, efficiency analysis
1. Introduction
(a) Scope of the Study
We report the results of resesarch in which we empirically evaluate the determinants of
performance for a panel of Indian state-owned manufacturing firms for the period 1987 to
1991. Both the measurement and quanitification of performance at the firm level within the
state-owned sector, and determining the sources of variation in performance, are useful from
a policy-making perspective. However, in spite of the economic importance of these issues,
systematic empirical evidence is sparse. Impressions of the performance of state-owned
enterprises originate in informal case studies or anecdotes (Millward, 1988). The empirical
literature that does exist looks at the subjective goal orientations of managers in public
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enterprises (Ramamurti, 1987), factors determining the autonomy of managers in public
enterprises (Lioukas, Bourantas, and Papadakis, 1993), cultural sources of excellence in
well-performing state-owned firms (Khandwalla, 1990), or at comparing the performance
of private and state-owned enterprises in competitive environments (Boardman and Vining,
1989). Further, empirical work specifically addressing the issue of performance of the
state-owned sector has largely focused at either the sectoral level (Bhaya, 1990), or used
individual case studies (Khandwalla, 1990), and to our knowledge, there is an absence
of studies which analyze the determinants of performance in state-owned enterprises in a
large-sample firm-level format.
We measure firm-level performance using data envelopment analysis, a technique use-
ful for a comparative evaluation of firm-level efficiencies. We then explain variations in
performance of these Indian state-owned manufacturing enterprises using a pooled cross-
sectional regression analysis. This approach is consistent with the recommendations of
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1981) who note that combining DEA and regression analysis
permits fine-grained efficiency analysis of firms where traditional performance methods
have not proven to be useful. The paper unfolds as follows. In the next section we discuss
the background and motivations for the study. In section three we discuss the conceptual
and contextual frameworks. In section four we discuss the empirical procedures. In section
five we discuss results, and section six concludes the paper with a summary of our findings
and their implications.
(b) Motivation for the Study
In developing economies the role of state enterprises is critical. In terms of magnitude,
state-owned firms constitute a larger proportion of organized industrial activity. Also, due
to the closed nature of many of these economies, this sector has been generally free of
competitive pressures, and this privileged position, combined with an ambiguous mandate
of serving social interests, has led to markedly poor performance of the state-owned sector,
when measured in conventional financial terms (Newbery, 1992). Yet, state-owned enter-
prises constitute a significant proportion of the total manufacturing value-added in these
economies, and the fortunes of these nations are inextricably linked to the performance of
these firms. since industrial progress is determined not only by the rate of expansion of
resources employed, as reflected in investments, but by the way these resources have been
utilized.
Efficient resource utilization generates surpluses, which can then be reinvested towards
the creation of further capabilities. Hence, an improvement in the efficiency of these
manufacturing firms can be seen to have a direct impact on the future productive capabilities
of these nations by providing higher levels of re-investible surplus. For instance, Jones
(1991) indicates that a 5 per cent increase in the efficiency of state-owned enterprises,
without any changes in prices or investment, would result in freeing resources of about 5
per cent of GDP in Egypt, or reduce 50 per cent of direct taxes in Pakistan, or fund a 150
per cent increase in Govt. expenditures in education, health, culture and science in China.
Solutions to the low performance of state enterprises have focused on the sector as the
unit of analysis; however, analysis at the firm level may provide additional insights, since,
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firm-level analysis can identify performance differentials between firms in the state-owned
sector. Such an analysis can help in drawing up a schedule of priorities for policy makers,
who can focus aggressively on select firms.
Second, based on firm-level analysis, if the variations in performance can be systematically
related to other observable characteristics of the enterprise, then an additional perspective
can be obtained on the problem of inefficiency. For instance, finding that firms with certain
attributes or operating in particular market environments, such as manufacturing versus
service or financial sector firms, are significantly poorer performers relative to others can
form the basis of specifically-targeted policies addressing firms with these characteristics,
or operating in such environments. Hence, a systematic analysis of the factors affecting the
variations in efficiency helps to provide useful inputs into the policy-making process.
2. Conceptual & Contextual Issues
Basing ourselves on literature dealing with performance analysis (Capon, Farley and Hoenig,
1990; Caves, 1992) we suggest that performance differences among state-owned firms can
be explained as arising from firm-specific characteristics, characteristics specific to partic-
ular institutional environments, and characteristics which are generic to the overall envi-
ronment. It is widely recognized that there is a great deal of heterogeneity between firms
and firm-level factors can explain a significant amount of performance variations (Nelson,
1981). Simultaneously, competitive intensity and resource scarcity in the business environ-
ment (Lawrence and Dyer, 1983) engender behavioral patterns which may or may not be
efficiency-inducing. However, industry or sector specific forces generate incentives (Powell
& DiMaggio, 1991) which also affect performance. These need to be taken into account.
Since 1956, when the role of state-owned enterprises was clearly articulated as reaching
the “commanding heights” of the economy, almost every conceivable sub-sector of Indian
industry has seen the presence of these firms (Marathe, 1989). Apart from defense firms,
which are traditionally in the public domain, generation of atomic and non-atomic power,
manufacture of aircraft, heavy machinery, and equipment for rail and sea transport, are
all industries exclusively run by state-owned firms. State-owned firms are active in every
sector of the economy, from petrochemicals and manufacturing to mining, trading, and
services and, as Jalan (1991) and Joshi and Little (1994) note, of the top twenty-five largest
corporations in India twenty are state-owned firms. However, in this study we restrict our
focus specifically to state-owned firms in the manufacturing sector. Given our agenda of
relative performance evaluation, such a focus is necessary, so as to ensure comparability
across firms.
The performance of Indian state-owned firms has been notably below par. Mere prof-
itability review, however, is assumed to ignore the socio-economic objectives associated
with state-owned enterprises. These socio-economic objectives include the promotion of
income and wealth redistribution, creation of employment, promotion of regional devel-
opment, promotion of import substitution, and being “model employers” (Nayar, 1990).
But there is now recognition that substantial improvements in the efficiency of state-owned
enterprises, so as to provide a reasonable return, is critical for economic progress given the
large investments that have been made in them (Jalan, 1991; Joshi and Little, 1994).
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3. Empirical Analysis of Firms in the Indian State-Owned Sector
(a) The Use of Data Envelopment Analysis in State-Owned Firms’ Efficiency
Measurement
The measurement of performance for state-owned enterprises is complicated by an absence
of clearly quantifiable objectives, and multiplicity of goals. Differing perceptions of public
interest and conflicting instructions further compound the problem of performance eval-
uation (Aharoni, 1981), and purely financial indicators of performance are inappropriate
(Smyth and Mayston, 1986; Tulkens, 1992). From a pragmatic perspective, DEA is useful
in performance analysis even if financial statement data are used (Smyth, 1990; Thore,
Kozmetsky and Phillips, 1994). An ideal performance measure can never be specified,
given the heterogeneity of objectives and management capabilities. No one way of how
best to do things can ever be specified, since there is causal ambiguity in how firms operate.
However, based on data of what firms have done, empirical functions can be derived based
on what is actually attainable among a group of firms being evaluated. Using the results,
an assessment of which are the seemingly more managerially-competent firms is possible.
There is a very large literature on DEA, and we do not go into detail in this paper. Readers
may refer to the pieces by Majumdar (1995) and Seiford and Thrall (1990).
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) [CCR] generalize the Farrell (1957) output-input
measure of efficiency to a multiple output-input case, using a fractional mathematical
program in which the ratio of the weighted outputs to weighted inputs of each observa-
tion is maximized. This non-parametric programming approach (data envelopment anal-
ysis [DEA]) uses observed input and output observations of firms (decision-making units
[DMUs]), that use same inputs to produce same outputs, though in varying amounts, to
characterize a production possibility set, and, thereafter, to determine an efficient subset
based on the observed data. For each observation a statistic, which is a ratio measure of
efficiency, is calculated.
The generalized DEA model (Golany and Roll, 1993) can be presented by means of the
following mathematical programming formulation:
Maxe0,0 (1)
subject to:
ej,0 ≤ 1, ∀ j (2)
µr 0 ≥∈, ∀r (3)
νi 0 ≥∈, ∀i (4)
wheree0,0 is a measure of efficiency for every firm-level observation that is being evaluated,
j = 1, . . .n is the index for all observations, 0 being used as the index for the observation
specifically evaluated, andr = 1, . . . R is the index for the outputs, (yr j ≥ 0 is outputr of
observationj ); i = 1, . . . I is the index for the inputs, (xi j ≥ 0 is inputi of observationj );
ej,0 is the relative efficiency of observationj , when observation 0 is evaluated;µr 0, νi 0 are
the output and input weights, respectively, associated with the evaluation of observation 0;
and∈ is a non-Archimedean infinitesimal quantity.
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In (2), the input(xi j ) and output(yr j ) factors are known quantities observed from the





µr 0 yr j /
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i=1
νi 0 xi j (5)




µr 0 yr j − u0/
I∑
i=1
νi 0 xi j (6)
whereu0 is an unconstrained decision variable yields the Banker, Charnes and Cooper
(1984) [BCC] model.
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) extend the CCR methodology in an important way.
The efficiency parameter generated by the CCR algorithm for each observation includes
the effects of both scale and technical efficiencies that the observations are able to attain.
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) analytically demonstrate that the CCR efficiency score
can be broken up into two separate components; the first is a pure technical efficiency
component, as to whether firms are able to attain maximum possible output with their
input bundles at existing scale size, and, in the algorithm that BCC develop, the technical
efficiency score generated captures the pure resource-conversion efficiencies attained by
firms, irrespective of whether these firms enjoy increasing, decreasing or constant returns
to scale.
(c) Sample and Data on Indian State-owned Firms for Which Performance is Assessed
Our sample consists of sixty eight Indian state-owned enterprises in the manufacturing
sector for which we have firm level data for 5 years: 1987 to 1991. Data are obtained from
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy in Bombay, India. The descriptive statistics
for the sample are given in Table 1.
As shown by the table of descriptive statistics, there is wide variation in the sample of
state-owned firms we study. The mean value-added is Rs. 675 million while the standard
deviation is Rs. 1.72 billion and the range is Rs. 12.4 billion (Rs. 39 = $1). However, the
third quartile (75%tile) is Rs. 444 million, suggesting a significant skewness towards smaller
firms. Similar variation is revealed by the distribution of gross fixed assets, employees and
sales. Mean gross fixed assets are Rs. 3 billion, while the range is Rs 98 billion. The 3rd
quartile is Rs. 1.4 billion. With respect to sales, the average value is Rs. 3 billion, while the
range is Rs. 61 billion, and the third quartile is Rs. 2.3 billion. Actual employee numbers
range between 139 and 198,423. The mean is 12,361, while the third quartile is 15,402.
These data show that while there are a few substantially large firms in existence, on the
whole the manufacturing segment of the Indian state-owned sector comprises of a large
number of small firms.
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Table 1.Descriptive statistics for the sample firms1.
Value-Added Gross Fixed Employment Sales Age
Assets (Actual) (Years)
Mean 675.75 3044.23 12,361 3042.89 25
Standard 1717.90 12084.57 26,201 8082.98 15
Deviation
Range 12434.60 97846.84 198,284 61366.37 66
Inter-Quartile 373.91 1307.96 13,873 2111.44 15
Deviation
Maximum 12441.90 97858.70 198,423 61408.34 71
75%tile 444.42 1448.50 15,402 2299.85 30
50%tile 197.60 387.76 3,463 752.53 22
25%tile 70.51 140.54 1,529 188.42 15
Minimum 7.30 11.86 139 42.00 5
1All figures are five-year (1987 to 1991) averages; financial figures are presented in
Rupee millions (Rs. 39 = $1).
Table 2.DEA models estimated.
DEABI DEAVAGDF DEAVAN DEAVANDF
Output: Net Value Added Net Value Added Net Value Added Net Value Added
Inputs: Employees Employees Employees Employees
Gross Fixed Assets Gross Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets
Deflated: No Yes No Yes
(d) Inputs, Output and Models Estimated
We estimate a number of performance models, using different inputs and outputs, all using
the BCC algorithm. The distinction between the BCC and CCR models have been discussed
in the earlier sub-section. The DEA models estimated are tabulated in Table 2. In the base
model, we use one primary output: net value added by operations. Value added is commonly
used to capture firm-level output (Jackson and Palmer, 1988), and two inputs: total of firms
fixed assets and number of employees. While in the short-run, the amount of fixed assets
and the number of employees may be fixed, the usage of fixed assets and employees is under
the discretion of management (Bhaya, 1990).
In the contemporary literature on efficiency measurement (Caves, 1992) both value added
and gross output (Ahluwalia, 1991) are concomitantly used to measure output. Griliches and
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Ringstad (1971) advance arguments in favour of using value added because it facilitates
comparison of results for manufacturing firms which may be heterogeneous in material
consumption. A further choice arises between the use of either gross or net value added
as the output measure. Denison (1974) makes a case for the use of net value added on
theoretical grounds by arguing that, since gross value added includes a measure of capital
consumption, there is no rationale as to why capital consumption ought to be maximized
rather than minimized. The use of value added or gross output, however, often depends on
data availability.
Nevertheless, value added captures hybrid aspects of firms’ activities, as both Bruno
(1978) and Diewert (1978) have noted. First, it captures a “production relationship” between
primary factors and firms’ output. This relationship is based on management’s capabilities.
Second, it also captures a “profit-generating relationship” between firm-specific human and
physical capital and firms’ output, which, while also dependent on endogenous management
capabilities, is highly dependent on exogenous demand and supply conditions, since these
conditions determine the prices a firm is able to charge for its outputs. In the context of
state-owned firms in developing countries, administered price regimes may be in operation,
and governments often use state-owned firms to operate as indirect tax collectors (Reddy,
1990). In the case of India, this is particularly true for state-owned oil firms. Thus, there
may be a large element of windfall price gains captured in the value added measure for each
firm. We control for this problem by only including manufacturing firms in our sample, and
particularly exclude oil-sector and trading-sector state-owned firms which operate under
special price regimes.
To check the robustness of our results, and account for the possibility of inflation affecting
our measure of efficiency, we also estimate DEA models under a number of different
specifications of value added and assets. Specifically, we use two measures of the fixed
assets variables (gross fixed assets and net fixed assets) and run the analysis for both these
variables with and without inflation adjustments. In Table 2 we list the various DEA models
that we have estimated.
We first compute two sets of DEA scores using gross fixed assets as one of the inputs:
DEABI andDEAVAGDF. DEABI is the base-model DEA score, derived using gross fixed
assets and number of employees as the inputs and value-added as the output, with no
adjustments made for inflation in either value-added or gross fixed assets.DEAVAGDFis
the DEA score derived using inflation-adjusted values of gross fixed assets and value-added.
The wholesale price index for manufacturing is used as the deflator for both variables, an
approach consistent with prior empirical work (Goldar, 1986). Using 1987 as the base
year, the index is used to deflate the values of gross fixed assets and value-added for all the
subsequent years. As Table 3 indicates, the distributions of the two scores are very similar,
and Table 4 shows that the correlation between them is 0.98.
Thereafter, we compute two more sets of DEA scores using Net Fixed Assets as an input
variable in place of gross fixed assets:DEAVANandDEAVANDF. Since capital vintage
and depreciation effects can vitiate the analysis, the computation of these scores represents
an attempt to check the sensitivity of the DEA scores to the use of different measures of the
assets variable. A large discrepancy between scores obtained by using net fixed assets vis-`a-
vis scores obtained by using gross fixed assets as inputs can indicate measurement problems
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Table 3.Efficiency results for the sample firms1.
DEABI DEAVAGDF DEAVAN DEAVANDF
Number of firms 68 68 68 68
Mean Efficiency Score 0.347 0.371 0.369 0.391
Standard Deviation 0.251 0.256 0.248 0.258
Range 0.947 0.948 0.955 0.943
Inter-Quartile Deviation 0.282 0.284 0.292 0.326
Maximum 0.981 0.994 0.991 0.992
75%tile 0.462 0.476 0.477 0.531
50%tile 0.267 0.306 0.278 0.309
25%tile 0.180 0.192 0.185 0.205
Minimum 0.035 0.046 0.035 0.049
1All figures are five-year (1987 to 1991) averages.
Table 4.Correlation between different DEA scores.
DEABI DEAVAGDF DEAVAN DEAVANDF
DEABI 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.95




All correlation values are significant at p< .001
stemming from depreciation and vintage effects. For the first set of scores (DEAVAN) no
adjustment is made for inflation in any of the variables. For the second set of scores
(DEAVANDF) net fixed assets and value-added are both deflated using the wholesale price
index for manufacturing. As Table 3 indicates, the distributions of the two variables are
similar and the correlation between the scores is 0.97. Also of note is the fact that the
correlations between the scores derived with net fixed assets as the input variable and the
corresponding scores derived with gross fixed assets as the input variable are also high, with
r = 0.96 for the measures unadjusted for inflation, andr = 0.97 for the measures adjusted
for inflation (see Table 4). The DEA results are, thus, robust to a variety of specifications.
The Cronbach’s alpha between the four DEA Scores is 0.99.
While it is hard to disentangle the “production relationship” and “profit-generating rela-
tionship” components of value-added that we have earlier referred to, a test to evaluate how
far market or price distortions may affect the composition of value added is to correlate var-
ious profitability measures with DEA-generated efficiency indices which have used value
added as the output measure. We calculate a series of profitability ratios for the 68 firms that
we study for the five-time periods. These ratios are:OPERMGN-ratio of operating profit
to net sales,NETMGN-ratio of net profits to net sales,OPERASS-ratio of operating profits
to gross fixed assets,NETASS-ratio of net profit to gross fixed assets, andNNETASS-ratio
of net profit to net fixed assets. The correlation matrix between the primary DEA score
(DEABI) and these measures of profitability and given in Table 5.
The correlation coefficients between the different profitability ratios range between 0.60
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Table 5.Profitability—DEA correlations.
DEABI OPERMGN NETMGN OPERASS NETASS NNETASS
DEABI 1.00
OPERMGN 0.49 1.00
NETMGN 0.45 0.68 1.00
OPERASS 0.47 0.94 0.59 1.00
NETASS 0.37 0.63 0.88 0.67 1.00
NNETASS 0.32 0.54 0.76 0.60 0.92 1.00
All correlation values are significant at p. < 001
and 0.92, and the maximum correlation between the DEA score and any one of the prof-
itability ratios is 0.49. The lowest such correlation coefficient is 0.32, betweenDEABI
andNNETASS. Given the sample-size, all correlation coefficients turn out to be significant;
however, we also compute the Cronbach’s alpha between the base DEA score,DEABI and
NETMGNwhich is estimated to be 0.61. This indicates that the underlying dimensions of
performance whichDEABI andNETMGNcapture are not identical.
(e) Regression Model, Variables and Hypotheses
Dependent Variable
To evaluate differences in performance, as revealed by the DEA scores, we use a log-
transformed version (the DEA scores range between 0 and 1 and are limited to a half-
normal distribution; transformation converts this into a log-normal form) of these scores
as the dependent variable in a regression model. This enables a second-order assessment
of performance. We run separate regressions using different DEA scores (DEABI, DEAV-
AGDF, DEAVAN, DEAVANDF) as the dependent variable in each, so that the sensitivity
of the explanatory variables to different specifications of the dependent variable can be
assessed, using the logged versions of the scores as the dependent variable in each case.
The independent variables are discussed next.
Firm-specific Factors:
AGE: The relationship between firm age and performance has been examined extensively
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989). The thesis of structural inertia argues that older firms,
being set in their ways, find it difficult to change their established routines (Hannan and
Freeman, 1989). Firms operate through sets of routines, which enables them to function in
a standardized fashion and ensure reliability in their performance. However, this reliability
comes at a cost. As evolution proceeds, and times change, the organization finds itself
unable to adapt, as the very standardization that ensures reliability becomes a blockage.
Thus, over a period of time the organization can fall increasingly out of line with its external
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environment. In a market context, such an outcome eventually leads to organization failure
due to the logic of natural selection.
In the context of the state-owned sector, the absence or relatively muted presence of
market signals implies that over a period of time firms become progressively outdated
in their modes of thought and action but bureaucratic practices prevent a commensurate
evolution in organizational routines to catch up with the times. However, such firms, even
though inappropriately managed, may still survive in the state-owned sector through the
immortality conferred by taxpayer support and the soft-budget constraint. Accordingly, we
expect age to be associated with relative inefficiency. The incorporation year for each firm
is given; computing age is not problematic.
SIZE:The relationship between firm size and efficiency is unclear, a-priori. The organiza-
tional theory and strategy perspectives provide ambiguous predictions on the effect of size.
On one hand, larger size enables greater differentiation and specialization, and should lead
to higher efficiency (Prescott and Vischer, 1980). On the other, it makes the managerial
task more difficult due to increased coordination requirements (Downs, 1967). Further,
increased size tends to be associated with higher bureaucratization, bringing into play many
of the issues discussed in the context of age. Thus, the final prediction, based purely on
theoretical considerations, is unclear.
The institutional setting of our research provides another argument with respect to size
effects. In the context of the Indian public sector, managing a much larger unit is associated
with higher prestige and perquisites. For example, there are firms such as Bharat Heavy
Electricals Limited and Steel Authority of India Limited which have attracted top-flight
managerial and technical talent. Hence, other things being equal better managers should
self-select into the larger or more prestigious manufacturing units. Therefore, larger firms’
performance should be better. From the perspective of government too, it makes sense to
appoint the best managers to the largest manufacturing units, as these represent the largest
investments by the government in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, there are
also very large monopoly firms such as Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited in which the
technical and managerial manpower quality is quite low. The overall effects of the various
arguments remain unclear and must be empirically resolved. Size is measured by taking
the natural log of sales. This is a standard approach (Scherer and Ross, 1990).
MONOPOLY:Monopoly status, in general, is associated with inefficiency (Scherer and
Ross, 1990). A monopolist can deviate from cost minimization conditions associated with a
competitive environment, and there are strong behavioral arguments that indicate this to be
the case. In general, a monopoly faces lesser pressure on prices and costs than that which
would provide incentives for achieving cost-savings (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Further,
the absence of competition implies that there is no external standard that the monopolist
can use to judge the efficiency of its own operations. Hence, even given the motivation
to be efficient, a monopolist may simply lack the information required for comparative
bench-marking which spurs better performance. Finally, from a share-holder perspective,
the absence of competitive yardsticks to judge the performance of a monopoly’s managers
implies that the ability of owners to monitor and control the managers may be impaired.
This may foster inefficiency (Tirole, 1988).
In the context of the state-owned sector these arguments are relevant. The absence of a
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profit motive implies that the duality of microeconomic theory, where profit maximization
implies cost minimization, may be less than relevant. Further, the multiplicity of objectives
may confound performance measurement to an even greater extent in the state-owned sector,
leading to the information and control problems mentioned above. On balance however it
appears that there is little reason to expect a positive relationship between monopoly status
and efficiency, and a priori, we expect a negative relationship to exist betweenMONOPOLY
and efficiency. The measure is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the firm is a monopoly
and 0 otherwise.
General Environmental Factors:
The introduction of competition increases the number of firms fighting for the same stock
of resources in their environments. There is no longer taken-for-granted resource sup-
ply (Lawrence and Dyer, 1983). To survive, firms have to utilize their resources more
parsimoniously, and the introduction of competition as a solution to the problem of ineffi-
ciency has been suggested for both state-owned firms and regulated monopolies (Newbery,
1992).
The Indian experience, where since the mid-1980s there has been increasing competition
facing firms (Marathe, 1989), provides a natural experiment to evaluate this argument
empirically. Further, it provides the context of an environment wherein competition has
long been absent or muted, and levels of inefficiency are historically high. Thus, there is
both motivation and opportunity for increased efficiency in the state-owned sector, and the
arguments made above should come into play.
The recent reforms by storm, which commenced in 1991, include relaxation of industrial
controls and legislative restraints in the domestic private sector, an increase in foreign
participation in the economy, and the opening up of industries that were earlier reserved for
state participation to the private sector. However, reforms by stealth were introduced in 1980,
by prime minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and later prime minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi continued
reforms with reluctance from 1985 onwards (Bhagwati, 1993). In particular, during the
closing period of Mrs. Gandhi’s regime, a series of investigation commissions of enquiry
into economic issues were appointed, and one in particular: the Arjun Sengupta Committee
made far-reaching recommendations in respect of state-owned enterprises management,
which Mr. Rajiv Gandhi’s government attempted to implement.
These reforms were operationalized by the implementation of private-sector manage-
ment practices in the late 1980s captured via documents between state-owned enterprises’
management and the controlling ministries which were called “memorandums of under-
standing” spelling out explicit performance parameters which the enterprises were to attain
on a year-to-year basis (Trivedi, 1992). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that over time
there has been a distinct movement away from the business as usual philosophy of the
state-owned sector. Given this increasing liberalization over the period under study, we,
therefore, expect a positive and secular time-trend in the efficiency of firms. In our model,
we operationalize time as a set of dummy variables. The variablesDATE1 throughDATE4
denote the years 1988 through 1991, with 1987 being the omitted category. We expect the
coefficients of later-year dummies to be greater than those of all preceding years.
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We also control for two other institutional variables that could conceivably affect the op-
erating efficiency of the units in question—ownership control with the Ministry of Defence
(MoD) or the Department of Textiles (DoT) in the Ministry of Commerce.
MoD—a number of firms, subject to day-to-day control of the Ministry of Defence are
run as ostensibly commercially-oriented firms. Since the decisions undertaken in these
firms follow the dictates of national defence policy, are impacted by the defence budget,
and their transactions are subject to supervision by the armed forces, it is possible that their
behavior may differ systematically from the rest of the state-owned sector. We code these
firms as 1, and code all other firms as 0 on theMoD variable.
DoT—one of the fall-outs of Indian industrial policy has been the near-death of a number
of firms as a result of owners’ malfeasance (Nayar, 1990). Consequently, the government
has taken over these firms so as to continue worker employment. The problem has been
particularly acute in the textiles sector (Mazumdar, 1991). Hence, there is a priori reason to
believe that performance of firms in the state-owned textile sector may be markedly inferior
to other state-owned firms. Such firms were coded as 1 on this variable while all other firms
were coded as 0.
(f) Estimation Procedure for the Regression
We use a pooled cross-section study design with sixty-eight firms and five time periods.
We conduct a series of heteroskedasticity tests which reveals the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity. Further, computation of the pooled Durbin-Watson statistic (Bhargava, Franzini &
Narendranathan, 1982) reveals distinct serial correlation among the residuals. A simple
check for collinearity, another potential problem, reveals no large significant correlations
between most of the variables, except thatMONOPOLYis correlated withMoD|r | = .63.
No other correlation of greater than 0.4 is observed among any of the variables.
Using the above information, we decide to use the generalized least squares procedure
suggested by Kmenta (1986). This procedure allows the specification of a general form
of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals, with heteroskedasticity and first order
auto-correlation, being both permissible. Further, given our small time-series dimension
(T = 5), we opt to use the sample correlation coefficient approach to estimatingρ—the
autocorrelation coefficient (Kmenta, 1986). This provides a consistent estimate ofρ and
ensures that it is confined to the interval−1 to+1. The results of this estimation form the
basis of our further discussions.
4. Results
(a) DEA Efficiency Estimates for the Indian State-owned Firms Evaluated
The DEA-generated managerial efficiency scores are discussed briefly first. The pattern for
all five years are reviewed together. Details of the scores are given in Table 3, to which we
have already made an earlier reference.
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Table 6.Correlation matrix for independent variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. AGE 1.00
2. SIZE 0.110∗ 1.00
3. MONOPOLY 0.095 0.169∗ 1.00
4. DATE 1 −0.033 −0.046 0.000 1.00
5. DATE 2 0.000 0.008 0.000 −0.25∗ 1.00
6. DATE 3 0.033 0.052 0.000 −0.25∗ −0.25∗ 1.00
7. DATE 4 0.067 0.067 0.000 −0.25∗ −0.25∗ −0.25∗ 1.00
8. MoD 0.085 0.170∗ 0.634∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.00
9. DoT −0.267∗ −0.007 −0.129∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000−0.129∗ 1.00
Significant at∗ p< 0.05
The average efficiency score (DEABI) of the sixty-eight state-owned firms is 0.35, on a
scale of 0 to 1. This implies that there are only a few truly efficient firms in the sample,
but relatively all the other firms are inefficient. There is also significant variation in such
inefficiency patterns. The standard deviation of the scores is 0.25, and the coefficient of
variation is 0.714. However, the results are significantly skewed towards inefficiency. The
median efficiency score is 0.27 and the 75th percentile score is 0.46. The inter-quartile
deviation is only 0.28 and this parameter suggests the magnitude of inefficiency that exists
in the Indian state-owned sector, with the majority of the sample firms studied being skewed
towards inefficiency.
(b) Regression Results
The correlation matrix for the regressors is presented in Table 6, and the results of the pooled
regression, where the dependent variables is loggedDEABI are reported in Table 7.
The models explain between 35 and 69 percent of the variance in the DEA scores. For
the base DEA score, where logged DEA is the dependent variable, the model explains 44
percent of the variance in efficiency. As can be noted, the coefficients forSIZE, and three
of the fourDATE variables are all positive and significant. The coefficient of theDATE1
variable is positive, as expected, but not significant. The coefficient ofAGE is negative
and significant. We use bothAGE and L AGE (log of AGE) as regressors, as Table 7
indicates. The results are almost identical. The coefficients forM D andMONOPOLY
are not significant. Further, the fourDATEcoefficients follow the pattern predicted by us,
with eachDATEvariable being larger in magnitude than the preceding ones. In Table 8 we
display the results of the 6t-tests conducted to establish this result statistically.
The 6t-tests test the hypothesis that efficiency scores will be increasing over time for the
firms in our sample. We test the prediction:DATEi > DATEj for i > j . The appropriatet-
tests are of the form:t = (D AT Ei−D AT Ej )/ Standard error(D AT Ei−D AT Ej )where
t ∼ Student’st distribution. Standard errors for(D AT Ei−D AT Ej )are obtained from the
variance covariance matrix using the following relation: variance(D AT Ei − D AT Ej ) =
variance(D AT Ei )+ variance(D AT Ej )−2 covariance(D AT Ei D AT Ej ). The standard
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Table 8.T-tests of differences between DATE coefficients.
Number H0 HA T-stat Results∗
TEST 1 DATE2 = DATE1 DATE2 > DATE1 7.54 H0 is rejected.
TEST 2 DATE3 = DATE1 DATE3 > DATE1 9.53 H0 is rejected.
TEST 3 DATE4 = DATE1 DATE4 > DATE1 8.70 H0 is rejected.
TEST 4 DATE3 = DATE2 DATE3 > DATE2 6.02 H0 is rejected.
TEST 5 DATE4 = DATE2 DATE4 > DATE2 5.38 H0 is rejected.
TEST 6 DATE4 = DATE3 DATE4 > DATE3 1.54 H0 is not rejected.†
∗ p< .05
† rejected at p< .10
error is obtained by taking the square-root of the variance. The criticalt values of the one-
tailed tests are 1.65(p < 0.05) and 2.33(p < 0.01).
As these results show allt tests are significant as hypothesized except forDATE4 versus
DATE3. Further, the coefficient forDATE1 is significantly different from zero only at the 10
percent level indicating that performance improvements in 1988 over 1987 were probably
marginal. Thereafter, in 1989 and 1990 there were significant performance improvements
over the previous year. While the coefficient ofDATE4 is larger than that ofDATE3, the
difference between them is not statistically significant. This would seem to indicate that
increases in efficiency are beginning to slow down in the fifth year, after 3 years of sustained
improvement. There is also the possible impact of uncertainty induced in managers as a
result of the political upheavals that took place between 1990 and 1991, which may have
led to only an insignificant rise in performance between those years.
As earlier noted, we estimated separate regressions with the dependent variable being
scores from each of the DEA models that were run. These regressions help to test the
sensitivity of our results. The regressions are given in Table 9.
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Table 9.Pooled cross-section regression results.
Dependent Variables
LEAVAGDF LEAVAN LEAVANDF
AGE −0.0107∗∗∗ −0.0113∗∗∗ −0.0109∗∗∗
SIZE 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗ 0.1198∗∗∗
M O N O P OLY −0.0534 −0.2949 −0.1675
DATE1 −0.0065 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0023
DATE2 0.0609∗∗∗ 0.1609∗∗∗ 0.0871∗∗∗
DATE3 0.1111∗∗∗ 0.2759∗∗∗ 0.1595∗∗∗
DATE4 0.0833∗∗∗ 0.3106∗∗∗ 0.1529∗∗∗
MoD 0.3288 0.3642 0.3249
DoT −1.0619∗∗∗ −0.9289∗∗∗ −0.9752∗∗∗
C O N ST AN T −1.3215∗∗∗ −1.3208∗∗∗ −1.3788∗∗∗
BUSE R2 0.4257 0.4855 0.3490
As Table 9 shows, regression coefficients in all operations are broadly similar to each
other, and of similar significance. As a further check on our empirical procedures, we also
estimate a set of DEA models with sales as the output, with the inputs being employees
and gross fixed assets. Thereafter, we regress these DEA scores on the set of variables used
in previous regressions. The results of these regressions are similar in every respect to the
regression results that we have earlier reported, and which are displayed in Table 7.
(c) Discussion of Results
Our results support two of our predictions. The notion that state-enterprise reform can lead
to improvement in the efficiency of the incumbent firms finds empirical support. Further, the
notion that age of firms can be related to the efficiency of their operations is also supported.
However, perhaps the most important dimension of our results is more general than either
of these two findings. We find empirical evidence that efficiency is systematically related
to a number of firm characteristics, and that even within the state-owned sector there exist
significant performance differentials which can be explained as a function of firm-level and
environmental characteristics.
The results with regard toAGE, SIZE, and theDATE variables are robust to a wide
number of specifications as mentioned earlier. The significant and negative coefficient
on theAGE variable indicates that the theoretical expectation that age can be negatively
related to performance is indeed empirically borne out in the case of the Indian state-
owned sector. The logic of theory indicates that this effect operates through the onset of
bureaucratic rigidities. One solution to this problem of rigidity is to introduce a shock to the
organizational system. In the case of the Indian public sector an appropriate shock suggests
itself: privatization. A change in ownership and incentive structures may well provide the
shock that can break the inertia and rigidities that have set in. The lower levels of efficiency
of the older corporations make a case for early privatization, or dissolution, of the older
corporations.
128 AHUJA AND MAJUMDAR
The positive coefficient of theSIZEvariable is perhaps an interesting individual result. It
is also statistically the most robust result in that it remains positive and significant at 5 per
cent (or higher) level in the regressions and specifications almost without exception. The
arguments of size-inefficiency (Downs, 1967) for state-owned firms in the manufacturing
sector are not supported by the results. Instead, the results we obtain support our conjecture
that the larger state-owned manufacturing corporations are probably better managed. They
can attract better talent. In developing countries labor markets are significantly segmented
(Mazumdar, 1983). Therefore, one group of state-owned firms, the larger manufacturing
corporations, can obtain the best talent from technical and management institutions.
Conversely, the smaller state-owned firms do not have a prestige value associated with
them, nor are they repositories of technological capabilities which the large state-owned
firms are also able to purchase. The talent that the smaller and marginal firms often attract
are those for whom employment in state-owned firms is the last resort. The larger firms
can also acquire greater power vis-`a-vis the smaller firms in facing up to the civil servants
in their controlling ministries, since the manufacturing firms account for a large share of
capital investment in Indian industry, and can resist political and bureaucratic interference.
While we do not have incontrovertible evidence of the causal process that leads to the ob-
served relationship between size and efficiency, we do find strong evidence for the observed
relationship itself. The smaller public sector manufacturing firms are significantly and no-
tably inefficient relative to the larger ones. Hence, if privatization is a priority our results
indicate a need to focus upon the smaller corporations first. They may be easier to deal with,
since private investors may be more willing to buy smaller firms on a going-concern basis.
While the monopoly coefficient is negative, as expected, it is not significant. Hence, we
cannot claim to have substantiated our a priori expectation of a negative effect of monopoly.
However, we do note that, on average, manufacturing monopolies in the Indian state-owned
sector are not better performers than firms operating in competitive environments.
We must stress, however, that our results apply only for manufacturing sector firms.
Service sector firms, such as hotel enterprises, or financial sector firms owned by the Indian
state are also large. Firms such as Indian Airlines, and banks such as the State Bank of
India are extremely large relative to their private sector counterparts, unlike manufacturing
sector firms which do have large private sector competitors. Also, service and financial
sector firms are for the most part monopolies and union power is very strong in these
organizations (Nayar, 1990). Therefore, size and inefficiency may turn out to be correlated
if service or financial sector firms are studied.
Nevertheless, the impact of firm-specific factors can be tempered with a brief analysis of
the impact of general environmental factors on efficiency. Since the 1980s there has been
significant disquiet about the performance of state-owned firms (Bhagwati, 1993; Jalan,
1991; Joshi and Little, 1994; Marathe, 1989). Several measures to privatize or otherwise
divest them from state-owned control have been proposed and management process reforms
have also been undertaken. The threat of loss of job security, and intra-firm pecuniary
advantages, likely to arise in a liberalized environment do seem to have induced performance
improvements. Compared to the base year of 1987, the efficiency scores for all subsequent
years, 1988 to 1991, have monotonically risen. Hence, the assumption that industrial reform
induces managerial efficiencies cannot be disproved, at least in the Indian context.
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The DoT results essentially reflect our expectations at the start of the analysis. The
performance of firms under the control of this department is dismal, even in comparison to
the generally inefficient state-owned firms. The coefficient on theMoD variable is positive
but not significant, indicating that, in terms of performance, enterprises with a defence
affiliation are not likely to be more or less efficient than all other enterprises.
5. Conclusions
Our study of sixty-eight state-owned manufacturing firms in India, over a five-year period:
1987 to 1991, reveals a low level of efficiency in resource utilization on average: less than
0.35 on a scale of 0 to 1. Of course, these results apply only to the 68 firms studied, but
given that these firms are major players in the Indian industrial scene, there is significant
potential to improve economic performance even with the resources available. While the
low performance of this sector is widely known and acknowledged, the magnitude of the
figure, and the accompanying waste of resources that is indicated, casts a new light on the
urgency of the problems of Indian state-owned firms. Industrial progress is a function of
both the level of investment in resources, as well as the efficiency with which they have
been utilized. Given estimates of the size of the state-owned sector in India, if national
industrial capabilities are encapsulated in firms, the performance of firms we study have
probably led to a significant holding back, or perhaps even retrogression, of Indian industrial
performance.
Further, we find that there exists significant variation in the efficiency performance of the
firms in our sample. To explain these variations in performance, we use a framework drawn
from existing management literature. We find that, as posited, firm-specific characteristics:
age, size, market status, generic environmental factors: increasing competitive intensity, as
well as institutional characteristics all affect the performance of state-owned enterprises.
Our results provide public policy implications in suggesting that discussions about the
solutions to public enterprise problems must account for the heterogeneity of firms within the
state-owned sector. The results suggest that both firm-level as well as sectoral characteristics
need to be used to identify the worst performers within the public sector. Policies and actions,
such as privatization and closure, can be tailored to specific contexts keeping in mind these
micro firm-level factors. Further, our study draws attention to the need for developing a
schedule of priorities in terms of the enterprises to be targeted for remedial action. On
the basis of our analysis it appears that the smaller and older firms in the manufacturing
sector need attention. The conventional assumption that a monopoly firm is in maximal
need of institutional attention is not fully-sustained in the context of Indian state-owned
manufacturing enterprises, given the institutional constraints that impact on the behavior
of Indian industry. The results, however, may differ if service or financial sector firms are
studied.
In countries which have privatized large numbers of their state-owned firms, for prag-
matic reasons it is often the large and profitable establishments which have been sold. The
best examples of this are from the United Kingdom, where in the 1980’s a large number
of profitable state-owned monopolies, such as Amersham International, British Aerospace,
British Telecom and British Gas were sold. Conversely, there have been difficulties priva-
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tizing loss-making units such as British Coal, the various shipyards and the railway system.
The assumption is that profitable firms are more attractive from an investment point of view,
which is not necessarily invalid, is influencing current privatization policy in India. How-
ever, the inability or unwillingness to deal with those firms which are smaller and older, but
are low performers, may only compound future problems. Given the descriptive statistics
in Table 1, it is unlikely that there will be a large number of highly-successful state-owned
firms to privatize. Conversely, the smaller, lesser-known firms may continue to be a drag
on the public purse.
Our study has been exploratory in nature, given the absence of a stream of similar empirical
work. We suggest a number of other directions for research. First, the study itself needs to
be duplicated in different national circumstances. Second, we confine this research to the
public sector. In the absence of data limitations, a similar study ought to include a panel of
both private and state-owned firms, so as to make a joint assessment of the relative impact
of the determinants of performance.
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